I've been going over the 9/11 "Vans" on the
bridges and looking at "Saudi Intel" Bin Laden Inc. Safari
Club Le Cercle via Ptech and those connections to the
Mossad.
Notice where ever the "DEA" is so are the
future hi-jackers (and the CIA) and that gets into Abamnoff
and drug smuggling money laundering and Atta.
Also
about the vans on on 9/11 ... There are multiple vans and the
bomb sniffing dogs detected explosives...
some
links:
USA False flag terrorists Mossad 911 Jews
celebrate success !
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IfbOJIyW69k&feature=relatedAbramoff
and atta - mafia and murder connections
http://www.warandpiece.com/blogdirs/002695.htmlCasino
Watch - Terrorists At Casinos
http://www.casinowatch.org/terrorists/terrorists_at_casinos.html9-11
bridge van explosives - Google Search
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=9%2F11+bridge+van+explosives&btnG=Google+Search&aq=o&oq=van
full of explosives at the G.W. Bridge
http://crimesofthestate.blogspot.com/2007/09/corroborating-orwell-van-full-of.htmlTWO
-- DIFFERENT -- VANS
It should be clarified now that
there were at least two vans stopped that day, which has led
to some confusion.
One van was stopped at the "approach
ramp" to the "George Washington Bridge," with either two
suspects (CBS/Jerusalem Post) or three suspects (CNN).
A second van was stopped on a "service road off Route
3 near New Jersey's Giant Stadium" in "East Rutherford"
(ABC/Bergen Record), with five suspects. This van was stopped
"around 4pm" (ABC).
The latter van was stopped 12 miles
away (MAPQUEST) at the George Washington Bridge, after 10pm on
9/11.
We can be pretty damned certain
that:
1) There was a van very near the George
Washington Bridge.
2) It was stopped at the approach to the
George Washington Bridge by police.
3) The traffic across
the bridge was closed for several hours.
4) News reporters
were informed of a large amount of explosives in the
van.
5) Two or three people were in the van, and were
arrested.
6) No mention at all of these facts (or of "Urban
Moving Systems") was presented at the 9/11 Commission, and it
was never acknowledged by their (phony) report or by the
Congressional Joint Inquiry Report.And, you know
what? That's enough. Just the fact that we were told about a
truck bomb on the evening of 9/11 needed to be clarified and
explained by the U.S. federal government in significant
detail.
The fact that they have buried this and
pretended it never happened is damning in and of
itself.
At this point, one may say yes, a van was
stopped, but it didn't actually have explosives in
it.
Okay, but why would someone assume that CNN, CBS,
Jerusalem Post and others are wrong about the presence of the
explosives? And why is that assumption good enough?
How
did all of their sources provide them with the explosives
information in the first place?
The van had to contain
something that led police to conclude it was "tons" of
explosives (CNN), and "enough explosives ... to do great
damage to the George Washington Bridge." (CBS)
If so,
what was in the van? Let us see this evidence for
ourselves.
More importantly: were the two or three
suspects arrested at the bridge just ghosts? Didn't they
exist? What are their names?
Minutes after the arrests,
the Police Commissioner of New York City, Bernard Kerik,
confirmed (on CNN) from his own sources the arrest of "three
men in a van," and he had been told specifically that there
were "no explosives in the van." Kerik also evaded the
question of where exactly this van was
located:
YouTube - 911 Explosive laden van 2-3
arrests
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2CHq6JocvDMBut
they dissappear....
here is no van full of explosives
reported at the G. Washington Bridge Indybay
http://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2007/09/17/18448055.phpSuspicious
Activities Involving Israeli Art Students at DEA
Facilities
http://cryptome.info/0001/dea-il-spy.htmmore
excerpts...
...
e. Israeli Surveillance of Arab
Groups, the Future
Hijackers and FBI
Suspects_____________________
Israel’s Institute for
Intelligence and Special Tasks, commonly known as Mossad, is
the Israeli agency responsible for its external security. A
few days after September 11, Israeli intelligence officials
reported that two senior experts of Mossad had warned the
United States in August 2001 that large-scale terrorist
attacks on the U.S. mainland were imminent. They also informed
U.S. officials of the existence of a cell of as many as 200
terrorists preparing the operation.33
One highly placed
investigator stated later that fall that there was evidence
linking the Israeli DEA Groups to the gathering of
intelligence about the September 11 attacks. He refused to
disclose the evidence, however, since it was classified. A
highly regarded American journal that broadly covers Israeli
affairs reported in December 2001 that the Israeli DEA Groups
were spying on Islamic networks in the United States linked to
Middle East Terrorism.34
There was no implication in these
reports that the Israelis were involved in planning for or
carrying out the September 11 attacks. Rather, it was
suspected that the Israelis gathered advance information about
the attacks and decided not to share it. “What investigators
are saying is that that warning from Mossad was nonspecific
and general.” 35
...
8. Inadequate Israeli Warnings
in August 2001
As noted above, almost immediately after
September 11, reports emerged of Israeli warnings, in August,
that major terrorist attacks were imminent. On September 16,
2001 the Daily Telegraph (London) reported that Israeli
intelligence officials said that they--
“warned their
counterparts in the United States last month that large-scale
terrorist attacks on highly visible targets on the American
mainland were imminent. . . .
. . . (T)wo senior experts
with Mossad, the Israeli military intelligence service, were
sent to Washington in August to alert the CIA and FBI to the
existence of a cell of as many of 200 terrorists said to be
preparing a big operation.
They had no specific
information about what was being planned but linked the plot
to Osama bin Laden and told the Americans that there were
strong grounds for suspecting Iraqi involvement."102
The Los Angeles Times reported on September 20, 2001
that a “high-ranking U.S. law enforcement official” confirmed
that--
“FBI and CIA officials were advised in August that
as many as 200 terrorists were slipping into the United States
and planning ‘a major assault on the United States . . . .’
The advisory was passed on by the Mossad. . . . It
cautioned that it had picked up indications of a ‘large-scale
target’ in the United States and that Americans would be ‘very
vulnerable’, the official said.
It is not known whether US
authorities thought the warning to be credible, or whether it
contained enough details to allow counter-terrorism teams to
come up with a response. But the official said the advisory
linked the information ‘back to Afghanistan and [exiled Saudi
militant] Osama bin Laden.’”103
Fox News also reported
on May 17, 2002 (and apparently also on September 14, 2001)104
that-
“based on its own intelligence, the Israeli
government provided ‘general’ information to the United States
in the second week of August that an al Qaeda attack was
imminent.”
Neither the Commission in its Final Report or
in its Staff Statements nor the Joint Committee Report
specifically mentions any such warning from the Israeli
government. These Statements and Reports do, however, defer to
our intelligence community’s desire to safeguard and maintain
the secrecy of its “sources and methods”. These are likely to
have included Israeli warnings and the Israelis’ own sources.
But in view of the dramatic questions raised by the Israeli
Groups’ activities in the United States in the months leading
up to September 11, these sources and methods now need to be
disclosed.
As shown in the tabular comparison in
Exhibit E, the accounts of Mossad’s warnings in August bear
the unmistakable imprints of authenticity. Mossad’s warnings
were reported by the Daily Telegraph and others right after
September 11, well over two years before the Joint Committee’s
report and the publication of the Presidential Daily Briefing
(PDB) of August 6, 2001. Yet they bear a remarkable similarity
to both the Joint Committee’s description of “all-source
reporting” and the PDB’s account of “clandestine, foreign
government and media reports and recent FBI information.” The
key differences, as shown in Exhibit E, are Mossad’s warning
that (a) the attacks were imminent, (b) they were to take
place on the U.S. mainland, and (c) 200 terrorists were in the
United States to carry them out. Mossad also alone warned of
“suspected Iraqi involvement,” though this of course has never
been established and is generally considered to be untrue.
...
With ample room for personnel and electronic
equipment, the vans were ideal vehicles for electronic
eavesdropping.123 The extent to which Nice Systems, the
Israeli wiretapping company for which Tomer Ben Dor worked
(the Israeli with the reference to “DEA Groups” in his
computer files) will be a matter for the public inquiry. Nice
Systems was ideally suited to provide equipment and expertise
to the Israeli New Jersey Group because its U.S. headquarters
were located in Rutherford, New Jersey, near the center of the
Group’s operations (MAP 3).
The future hijackers were
frequent users of land lines and cell telephones and thus were
ideal subjects for electronic surveillance. Mihdhar regularly
telephoned a terrorist facility in the Middle East from the
United States.124 Both Mihdhar and Hazmi were “constantly on
their cell phones.”125 Mohamed Atta made calls to Madrid from
Coral Springs126 and used his cell phone to call lodging
establishments in Florida.127 Ramzi Binalshibh, a plot leader
based in Hamburg, frequently called Atta,128 Shehhi129 and
Moussaoui130 from Hamburg. Jarrah made hundreds of phone calls
from Florida131 and Hanjour, Hazmi and other hijackers made 75
calls in two days132 to locate apartments, flight schools and
car rental agencies for the New Jersey hijackers (of the
Pentagon Plane).
As to the Israeli DEA Groups’
surveillance of the DEA, it is difficult if not impossible to
learn from the public record, at this time, the precise nature
of the information they were seeking from that agency. The DEA
itself was not sure then, and it may not know to this day.
The DEA had its own concerns about the Israeli DEA Groups
relating to previous drug investigations, as noted above.
Perhaps these concerns were well-founded. Perhaps the Israelis
were using these units in part as a training ground (on our
soil) for future agents, or were interested in learning the
DEA’s methods for tracking drug traffickers and their money, a
potential source of funding for terrorist groups.
...
11. The CIA’s Role and Responsibilities
Finally, it is possible that the CIA was aware that the
two Israeli Groups were tracking suspected Arab groups on our
soil, but remained unaware until after September 11 that they
had come across the future hijackers. There is presently
little evidence of the CIA’s possible knowledge of the Israeli
Groups’ activities, beyond the sheer scope and magnitude of
the Israeli DEA Groups’ operations in the U.S., the CIA’s
general unwillingness to share information with the FBI, as
outlined in the Commission’s Final Report, and, perhaps, the
brazenness of the Israeli New Jersey Group on September 11.
The CIA’s clumsy reconstruction of the miraculous work of
“John”, “Mary”, “Jane” and “Alice”, which appears designed to
point away from the Israeli warnings, also raises legitimate
questions.
The CIA was prohibited by law from engaging in
field intelligence operations inside the United States. They
may have been reluctant to cooperate with the FBI because of
the burdensome constraints of constitutional protections
benefiting potential defendants. They may also have regarded
the Israelis as unusually effective because of their
familiarity with Arab culture and their common understanding
of the Arabic language.133
A leading Israeli
newspaper, Yedioth Ahronoth, reported in the fall of 2002 that
prior to the September 11 attacks, when members of the Israeli
DEA Groups were being detained or arrested across the United
States, the CIA “actively promoted their expulsion.”134 The
implication in that article was that the CIA was simply being
careless, not trying to spirit the Israelis safely out of the
country. But at this point we cannot be certain. The CIA may
have been eager to protect the surveillance activities of the
Israeli Groups a whole in an operation that, ultimately,
failed to protect us. Any delegation on the part of the CIA of
its responsibilities abroad to foreign agents in the U.S.
would, of course, have been unlawful. It would also have
rendered our country particularly vulnerable because, as
suggested above, the interests of the Israeli government and
its agents are not necessarily consonant with our own.
The
CIA also failed to press for the continuing detention of the
members of the Israeli New Jersey Group after their arrest on
September 11. After three months the men were released and
returned to Israel, even though their names had appeared in
our own counter-intelligence data base, at least two of them
were suspected Mossad agents, and their leader had fled to
Israel on or about September 14-only to be placed on the May
2002 FBI Suspect List a few months later.
12.
Detailed Summary
Set forth below is a detailed summary of
the tentative conclusions reached in this memorandum, which
amply illustrate the urgent need for a public inquiry into the
activities of the Israeli DEA Groups and the Israeli New
Jersey Group. The inquiry must include, without limitation,
the examination of members of the Israel Groups and related
persons; officials of the Israeli government and certain of
its agencies, including Mossad; FBI suspects, agents of the
DEA, the INS and the FBI; certain local law enforcement
officials; agents of the CIA (in camera to the extent
required); other intelligence sources cited by the public
press to the extent possible; the boxes of documents and
computer hard drives (referred on page 29) seized by the FBI
from the Israeli New Jersey Group; and of all other relevant
documents, reports, communiqués and information.--
1. The
Israeli DEA Groups were spying on the Drug Enforcement Agency
and thus upon the United States. The DEA itself has concluded
that they were probably engaged in organized intelligence
gathering on our soil.
2. A highly regarded American
journal knowledgeable about Israeli affairs, has concluded (a)
based on its own sources, that the Israeli DEA Groups were
spying on radical Islamic networks suspected of links to
Middle East terrorism, and (b) based on the representations of
a former American intelligence official regularly briefed on
these matters by law enforcement officials, that (i) at least
two members of the Israeli New Jersey Group were Mossad
operatives, (ii) Urban Moving, the company used by the Israeli
New Jersey Group, was a front for Mossad and its operatives,
and (iii) the Israeli New Jersey Group was spying on local
Arabs.
3. The intelligence sources of a substantial
American television network report that the Israeli DEA Groups
may have gathered information about the September 11 attacks
in advance, and not shared it with the United States. One
investigator said that evidence linking the Israeli DEA Groups
to such intelligence gathering was classified and could not be
disclosed.
4. The Israeli DEA Groups were comprised of 125
or more Israelis operating on our soil. Their leaders and
apparent associates included military commanders and experts
with military backgrounds in intelligence, electronic
intercepts and telecommunications.
5. The wiretapping and
intelligence expertise of members of both Israeli Groups, and
the use of vans in local neighborhoods where the future
hijackers were planning the attacks, and the extensive use by
the hijackers of cell phones and land lines, made the Israeli
Groups ideally suited to gather information regarding the
hijackers’ plans.
6. The principal operation of the
Israeli DEA Groups was located in and around Hollywood,
Florida, the central training and staging ground for the
hijacking of North and South Tower Planes and the Pennsylvania
Plane. The addresses and places of residence of the members of
the Israeli DEA Groups in Hollywood itself were within
hundreds of yards those of the future hijackers.
7. The
operations of both the Israeli New Jersey Group and the
hijackers of the Pentagon Plane were centered in Hudson and
Bergen Counties in New Jersey, within a common radius of about
six miles.
8. All five celebrating members of the Israeli
New Jersey Group arrested on September 11 were aware, when the
North Tower Plane struck the World Trade Center, based on
their immediate reaction to the attack and the information
said to be contained in their van, that the attack had been
planned and carried out by Arab terrorists.
9. After being
questioned by the FBI on September 11, the leader of the
Israeli New Jersey Group immediately fled the United States to
Israel. His name and aliases appear, along with those of the
hijackers and other FBI suspects, on the May 2002 FBI Suspect
list.
10. Israeli intelligence officials have reported
that two senior officials of Mossad warned the United States
in August 2001 that as many as 200 terrorists on American soil
were planning an imminent large-scale attack on high
visibility targets on the American mainland. One press report
states that in August Mossad provided the CIA with the names
of future hijackers Khaled al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi.
11. The CIA’s explanation of how Mihdhar’s and Hazmi’s
names were placed on the Watchlist through the spontaneous
efforts of CIA and FBI agents is not only difficult to follow
but, as the sole reason for the Watchlisting, hardly credible.
12. Mossad’s own information appears to have come from its
sources inside the United States. All of the facts and
circumstances set forth in this memorandum appear to show that
Mossad’s two likely sources of information were: (a) the
Israeli DEA Groups, comparable in number to that of the Arab
suspects and who appear to have tracked the future hijackers
in their central places of operation and in other states, and
(b) the Israeli New Jersey Group, operating through their
Mossad front in another principal locus of operations of the
future hijackers, two of whom were Mossad agents, and five of
whom appeared immediately aware of the origin of the attacks
on September 11.
13. While little direct evidence supports
the
contention that the CIA was aware of or condoned the
Israeli Groups’ tracking of Arab terrorist groups in the
United States prior to September 11, the CIA’s pressing for
the expulsion of members of the Israeli DEA Groups when they
were detained before September 11, their failure to cooperate
with the FBI, their circuitous explanation of how the above
two hijackers were placed on the Watchlist, and other relevant
considerations require that the issue be taken up as a part of
the public inquiry into these painful events.
Gerald Shea 
.gif)
